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ABSTRACT 
  The law regarding the admission of expert testimony in Alaska has 
undergone considerable change within the last few years, largely as a result of 
the influence of federal law. This Article explores both the background of 
Alaska and also charts the development of the law following a series of 
influential federal cases. After reviewing this history, the author advocates 
allowing trial courts broader discretion to exclude experts, but without 
reliance on particular federal holdings. This discretion, the author argues, has 
been an integral part of a uniquely Alaskan approach to expert testimony, but 
has, unfortunately, been retracted in reaction to recent federal rulings. 
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How trial courts evaluate and admit expert testimony in Alaska has 
come under increased scrutiny in the past decade. A number of 
landmark decisions by the United States Supreme Court in the 1990s 
marked a change in the direction taken by federal courts and seemed to 
signal the beginnings of a similar shift in Alaska’s courts. However, after 
initially accepting the federal approach of Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals,1 the Alaska Supreme Court rejected subsequent 
developments in the federal approach.2 The Alaska Supreme Court has 
gone far in its rejection of what it has perceived as a trend towards 
judicial intervention into the jury’s fact-finding role. This rejection has 
thrown into doubt the traditional role of trial courts as gatekeepers of 
proffered expert evidence. Unless the expert is offering a novel scientific 
theory, the trial court no longer appears to have the authority to verify 
the existence of sound methodology underlying the expert’s opinions, or 
to bar those opinions which have no reasonable or logical basis. Under 
current law, experts in Alaska must show only minimal personal 
qualifications to be able to present an opinion to the jury, even if that 
opinion has no basis in sound methodology or utilizes no methodology 
at all. Any witness with bare-bones qualifications can proffer almost 
unlimited testimony within the broad and largely self-defined 
parameters of his expertise. 
The Alaska Supreme Court’s reaction to the federal developments, 
though based on a justified concern about putting judges in the role of 
fact finder, has ultimately done a disservice to court and jury alike. It is 
not sufficient to require disputes over expert methodology to be 
resolved by adversarial process before a jury. Juries are only given a 
limited set of facts and are not in a position to make admissibility 
determinations. Leaving the matter solely to the adversarial process 
 
 1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 2. See infra Part III.B. 
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invites an arms race of experts and the use of “hired gun” experts to 
voice whatever opinion is needed. 
Yet the Alaska Supreme Court need not blindly follow or 
automatically adopt either the federal standard or the broad 
exclusionary approach that they have taken. All that is needed is a 
return to the common-sense, discretionary standard that held sway in 
this state long before the current battle over Frye v. United States,3 
Daubert, and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael4 found its way into Alaska 
courts. At the same time, Alaska could stay clear of the more invasive 
approach utilized by some of the federal courts. Thus, where an expert is 
able to voice a reasonable basis for an opinion that fairly fits the facts of 
the case and would be helpful to the jurors, the expert ought to be able 
to testify. There is no need for trial courts to substitute their own 
judgment for the judgment of the juries. Courts, however, should be 
permitted and encouraged to exercise their discretion to bar opinions 
which are based on pure guesswork or which lack the support of sound 
and logical methodology. Furthermore, trial courts should be given 
sufficient leeway to exclude those opinions which are within the 
comprehension of the jury, and therefore relate to facts which the jury 
needs no expert help in weighing. 
In Parts I and II, this Article examines the development of the 
federal standard for admission of expert testimony and contrast it with 
Alaska’s development. As will be shown, the two tracks have crossed at 
critical points, but each has its own standards and practices. In Part III, 
the Article explores emerging conflicts between the federal rules and 
Alaska’s practices. Finally, this Article will argue that this conflict is 
largely unnecessary because it is merely based on misunderstandings of 
the federal system and a failure to draw from the wisdom of Alaska’s 
own precedent. 
I.  CREATION OF THE FEDERAL STANDARD FOR ADMISSION OF 
EXPERT TESTIMONY 
It is useful for our purposes to examine exactly how the conflict 
resolved by Daubert and Kumho Tire arose and to distinguish between 
the general rules of expert admission and the particular rules pertaining 
to novel scientific evidence. The famous Frye opinion forms part of the 
backdrop to the problem. In that case, the court of appeals was asked to 
review the exclusion of expert testimony regarding a primitive blood-
 
 3. 239 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 4. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
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pressure based lie detector.5 The court, with minimal discussion or 
reasoning, held that “the systolic blood pressure deception test has not 
yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological 
and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting 
expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and 
experiments thus far made.”6 It is surprising that such a short and terse 
opinion would set the standard for admission of novel scientific theories 
for decades to come, but that is more or less what happened. Courts 
nationwide cited Frye and created the “Frye standard.” Under this 
approach, the admissibility of a novel scientific theory was tied to its 
acceptance in the scientific community. Opinions based on a theory, 
however reliable, that had not yet obtained “general acceptance” were 
excluded.7 
The Frye approach was brought into question by the creation and 
adoption of new codified evidence rules by the federal courts and many 
states. These new rules included the following provision on the 
admission of expert witnesses: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise . . .8 
The rules further stated that “[p]reliminary questions concerning 
the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, 
or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court.”9 
A faction of commentators and federal courts found a 
“gatekeeping” requirement implicit in these rules.10 Under this 
approach, the court has authority to assess preliminary admissibility, 
and Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence implies that to be 
admissible the proffered testimony must take the form of “scientific, 
 
 5. Frye, 239 F. at 1013. 
 6. Id. at 1014. 
 7. See, e.g., United States v. Tranowski, 659 F.2d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 1981) 
(rejecting the chart of an expert astronomer in a perjury trial over a false 
photograph where “the technology . . . relied on was not ‘sufficiently established 
to have gained general acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs’”) 
(quoting Frye, 239 F. at 1014). 
 8. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 9. FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
 10. See, e.g., United States v. Hope, 714 F.2d 1084, 1087 n.3 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(noting that “[t]he helpfulness test of Rule 702 . . . cast doubt on the continued 
vitality of Frye” and discussing the emerging split in circuits); see also Paul C. 
Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a 
Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980). 
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technical, or other specialized knowledge.”11 If the testimony is simply 
an unsupported assertion, then it cannot fit this basic definition and 
must be excluded. 
The conflict came to a head in Daubert.12 There, the United States 
Supreme Court faced the admissibility of an expert’s scientific opinion 
as to whether Bendectin was a teratogen.13 The district court heard 
extensive argument and expert testimony criticizing the methodology of 
the plaintiff’s expert and ultimately held that “[g]iven the vast body of 
epidemiological data concerning Bendectin, . . . expert opinion which is 
not based on epidemiological evidence is not admissible to establish 
causation.”14 The court of appeals affirmed, citing the Frye general 
acceptance standard. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Rule 
702 had replaced the “austere” Frye standard.15 The Court held that 
under the new standard set by the rules, “the trial judge must ensure 
that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only 
relevant, but reliable.”16 
It is important to remember that the Daubert Court uses the term 
“reliable” to refer to the specific and narrow concept of “evidentiary 
reliability.”17 The Court was not using the term “reliability” in its 
broader sense, and certainly an expert’s methodology that satisfies 
baseline evidentiary reliability can still be found unreliable or even 
unbelievable by the trier of fact. Under Daubert, trial courts are 
instructed to undertake “a preliminary assessment of whether the 
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically 
valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be 
applied to the facts in issue.”18 They are not to substitute their own 
determination of weight or credibility for that of the jury.19 
To assist in this preliminary assessment, the Daubert Court created 
its now-famous factors.20 These called for the trial court, after assessing 
the basic “fit” of the proffered testimony, to verify whether the scientific 
theory had been subjected to empirical testing, peer review and 
publication, its known or potential error rate, and its general acceptance 
 
 11. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 12. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 13. Bendectin is a drug prescribed to alleviate the symptoms of morning 
sickness, later pulled from the market. A teratogen is a drug or substance which 
causes birth defects. Id. at 582. 
 14. Id. at 583–84. 
 15. Id. at 589. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 590 n.9. 
 18. Id. at 592–93. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 593. 
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by the relevant scientific community.21 The Court noted that these were 
not “a definitive checklist or test.”22 Subsequently, Rule 702 was 
modified.23 The drafting committee recommended consideration of five 
flexible factors: 
(1) Whether experts are “proposing to testify about matters 
growing naturally and directly out of research they have 
conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have 
developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying.” 
(2) Whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an 
accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion. 
(3) Whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious 
alternative explanations. 
(4) Whether the expert “is being as careful as he would be in his 
regular professional work outside his paid litigation 
consulting.” 
(5) Whether the field of expertise claimed by the expert is 
known to reach reliable results for the type of opinion the 
expert would give. 24 
The Daubert Court admonished courts below that “the focus, of 
course, must be solely on the principles and methodology, not on the 
conclusions that they generate.”25 This caveat was the subject of 
challenge in the next major United States Supreme Court case to analyze 
the admission of expert testimony, General Electric Co. v. Joiner.26 There, 
the Court noted that: 
[C]onclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from 
one another. Trained experts commonly extrapolate from 
existing data. But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules 
of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence 
which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the 
expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an 
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.27 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (2000 Amendment). 
 24. See id. (Committee Notes on Rules—2000 Amendment) (internal citations 
and quotations omitted). 
 25. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. 
 26. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 27. Id. at 146. 
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This opinion has served as authority for excluding an array of 
“hired gun” experts who churn out the same basic conclusion in 
response to whatever facts happen to be at bar.28 
The next major decision on admission of expert testimony was 
Kumho Tire.29 The question before the Court was whether the Daubert 
factors could be applied to non-scientific experts. The Court held that 
Rule 702’s gatekeeping obligation applied to all experts, not just those 
with “scientific” knowledge.30 The Kumho Tire court noted that the 
Daubert list of factors is flexible and “neither necessarily nor exclusively 
applies to all experts or in every case. Rather, the law grants a district 
court the same broad latitude when it decides how to determine 
reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability 
determination.”31 In this case, the Court examined the proffered 
testimony of Carlson, a tire failure analyst, in detail.32 Based on a 
physical examination and “experience,” Carlson opined that a defect in 
the tire, not the owner’s misuse, caused a separation.33 
The trial court initially excluded Carlson’s testimony, but the court 
of appeals reversed on the grounds that Daubert applied only to 
“scientific” experts and not to experts whose conclusions were based on 
“experience.”34 The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit 
decision and upheld the original trial court determination.35 The Court 
noted that trial courts must “make certain that an expert, whether basing 
testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in 
the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the 
practice of an expert in the relevant field.”36 The Supreme Court itself 
engaged in a scrutiny of Carlson’s methodology and found numerous 
discrepancies and shortcomings.37 
 
 28. See, e.g., Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that Daubert is “germane to evaluating whether the expert is a hired 
gun or a person whose opinion in the courtroom will withstand the same 
scrutiny that it would among his professional peers”); Tyus v. Urban Search 
Mgmt., 102 F.3d 256, 263 (7th Cir. 1996) (“In all cases . . . the district court must 
ensure that it is dealing with an expert, not just a hired gun.”). 
 29. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 30. Id. at 141–42. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 144. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 146 (citing Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433 (11th 
Cir. 1997)). 
 35. Id. at 151. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 154–55. For example, the Court noted that Carlson’s methodology 
was based on his two-factor “tactile” examination of the tire, a method without 
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The impact of this line of cases has been felt far beyond the federal 
court system. As of this writing, a majority of states have abandoned the 
Frye standard in favor of Daubert or some modified version of Daubert.38 
The Kumho Tire decision remains more controversial than Daubert, and 
its adoption has been spottier. Commentators give varying reports on 
the progress of its adoption. Some are quite sanguine.39 Others report 
only a minority of states have gone along with the full federal approach 
as represented by Daubert, Joiner and Kumho Tire.40 Alaska’s own 
supreme court viewed Kumho Tire as restricting access to the courts.41 
But there is absolutely nothing in the language of the case that makes it 
“liberal” or “conservative,” nor does the case mandate exclusion of 
experts. It gives trial courts discretion to keep the proverbial “gate” up 
against experts unless they have something useful to add and have at 
least a modicum of reliable methodology to support their conclusions. 
There is no reason it should be a bar to litigants at all. 
II.  ALASKA’S PRE-DAUBERT STANDARD: THE EXPERT WITNESS IN 
ALASKA FROM STATEHOOD 
To see where Alaska’s standards for expert testimony ought to 
head, it is useful to remember where they started. The earliest opinions 
are not frequently cited in the context of adopting the latest 
 
any support from other experts. Id. The court also noted inconsistencies in his 
methods and contradictions in his testimony about his conclusions. Id. 
 38. See Robert J. Goodwin, Fifty Years of Frye in Alabama: The Continuing 
Debate Over Adopting the Test Established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 35 CUMB. L. REV. 231, 267 (2004-2005) (noting that “many 
states have found Daubert’s interpretation of the way the Federal Rules of 
Evidence regulate expert testimony to be persuasive, and a majority of states 
have adopted Daubert or a test consistent with Daubert.”). 
 39. Robin Jean Davis, Admitting Expert Evidence in Federal Courts and its 
Impact on West Virginia Jurisprudence, 104 W. VA L. REV. 485, 502 n.84 (2002) (“[A] 
majority of the states that have addressed the issue have adopted the 
Kumho/Daubert test.”). 
 40. Steven B. Hantler, Mark A Behrens & Leah Lorber, Is the “Crisis” in the 
Civil Justice System Real or Imagined? 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1172–73 (2005) (“A 
number of states have adopted Daubert, but a significant number have not. In a 
recent survey of state evidence law, it was found that only ten states have 
adopted all three holdings in the Daubert trilogy. Six states have adopted Daubert 
and Kumho Tire, but not Joiner. Eight states have adopted Daubert, but not Kumho 
Tire or Joiner. Five states, while not fully adopting Daubert, use the Daubert 
principles in their own tests. Eight states follow neither Daubert nor Frye. The 
remaining states still apply Frye.”) (citations omitted). 
 41. See Marron v. Stromstad, 123 P.3d 992, 1005–06 (Alaska 2005); see also 
infra Part III.B. 
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groundbreaking federal opinion.42 However, these opinions offer a 
distinctly Alaskan approach that, grounded in common sense, has much 
to recommend it. These decisions did not use the current lingo or insist 
on formal “Coon hearings,” “Daubert hearings” or any other wooden 
mechanisms for pretrial analysis. The analysis typically took place in the 
context of examining an expert’s “qualification,” but went well beyond a 
simple review of licenses and personal background. The courts in these 
early cases were in fact engaged in a gatekeeping analysis without 
calling it that. The current confusion about how trial courts should 
evaluate proffered expert testimony could be greatly reduced by a 
return to this approach. The particular terms used or factors relied upon 
are far less important than reviving the basic notion that Alaska’s trial 
courts should have a relatively free hand to block baseless or unreliable 
expert opinions. 
A. The Origins of the Approach: Oxenberg v. State 
The Alaska Supreme Court’s first significant inquiry into the 
admission of expert testimony came in Oxenberg v. State.43 Oxenberg, 
who had been convicted of arson, challenged the propriety of admitting 
the Territorial Fire Marshall as “an expert witness on the subject of 
fires.”44 The Fire Marshall conducted an investigation and concluded 
that the fire “was of incendiary origin, and he followed this by testifying 
in detail as to the facts upon which his opinion had been formulated.”45 
Oxenberg argued that the jury was fully capable of determining the 
origin of the fire without expert assistance, and that allowing an expert 
to testify on the matter would constitute “an invasion of the province 
and function of the jury and a substitution of the expert’s opinion for 
that of the jury on the ultimate issue to be decided.”46 
Justice Dimond, writing for the court, considered the issues in 
balance: 
If this was a matter of such common experience and 
understanding that the jury could decide the question without 
receiving assistance by way of an opinion from some other 
person, then the opinion evidence should have been excluded 
 
 42. As we shall see, the most recent opinions from the Alaska Supreme 
Court discussing Daubert and Kumho Tire do not appear to regard these early 
cases as having any bearing on the question of gatekeeping. 
 43. 362 P.2d 893 (Alaska 1961). 
 44. Id. at 900. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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because it would be superfluous. But if under the particular 
circumstances related here the jury could receive appreciable 
help or assistance from the opinion of the expert witness, then 
his testimony was admissible.47 
The court upheld the trial court’s decision to admit the testimony, 
explaining that “[q]uestions as to the admissibility of expert testimony 
should be left to the wise discretion of the trial judge.”48 The court 
reasoned that in the particular circumstances of the arson case, the 
origin of the fire “could not have been properly understood or 
determined without the aid of an opinion from a person of special 
knowledge and experience.”49 The Territorial Fire Marshall had this 
experience, and “had a sufficient acquaintance through personal 
observation and other means of investigation to enable him to express 
an opinion.”50 As to the propriety of an expert opinion on the ultimate 
issue, Justice Dimond noted that under the new “Uniform Rules of 
Evidence” under review by the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws, experts were permitted to testify as to the 
“ultimate issues.”51 
The Oxenberg opinion is probably best known in Alaska today for 
being one of the seminal opinions on corroborative testimony in 
criminal cases.52 It is fascinating to see, however, that all the basic 
elements involved in the admission of expert testimony in a modern 
federal case were present in the court’s reasoning, including the concept 
of the gatekeeping role itself. Thus, although the case was decided prior 
to the adoption of the uniform Federal Rules by Alaska’s courts, the 
Oxenberg court’s reasoning set an excellent foundation for those rules. 
Though the opinion is short, it is apparent that Justice Dimond 
envisioned several critical components to expert admission. First, there 
was the underlying notion that the trial court has broad discretion to 
allow a proffered expert to testify.53 The court reviewed the choice as a 
matter of discretion and implied that such discretion would not be 
overturned absent a showing, as explained by subsequent decisions, that 
the “reasons for the exercise of discretion are clearly untenable or 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at n.20. 
 52. See, e.g., Pulakis v. State, 476 P.2d 474 (Alaska 1970); Bodine v. State, 737 
P.2d 1072 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); Pickens v. State, 675 P.2d 665 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1984). 
 53. Oxenberg, 362 P.2d at 900. 
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unreasonable.”54 Second, the Oxenberg court understood that only a 
witness with suitable and applicable training and/or experience could 
testify.55 The Territorial Fire Marshall was established as such a witness 
to the satisfaction of the trial court because of his experience in the 
field.56 Third, the court noted that this particular expert actually 
investigated the case at hand.57 It is strongly implied, if not spelled out, 
that this was a hands-on investigation and not merely a review of 
records.58 Fourth, the court noted that the opinion must help the trier of 
fact.59 If the opinion did nothing more than state a conclusion “of 
common experience and understanding,” then the opinion would be 
excluded as superfluous.60 
Both the trial court and supreme court looked at who the expert 
was, what his opinion was, what kind of review his opinion was based 
on, and whether the jury actually needed expert help. At the same time, 
the supreme court did not chide the trial court for taking a look at the 
expert’s basic methodology (though they did not use that term), nor did 
they forbid the trial court from second-guessing the decision of a party 
to offer an expert’s testimony. The supreme court’s decision implied that 
the trial court had discretion to exclude this qualified fire marshal if 
either the jury did not need his assistance or if he never actually 
investigated the matter. 
B. The Development of the Standard 
The discretionary standard of expert admission established in 
Oxenberg was developed and expanded in the decades before the furor 
over Frye, Daubert, and Kumho Tire. In Ferrell v. Baxter,61 the trial court 
allowed Rudy Voight, an acknowledged expert on automobile accidents, 
to testify, but limited his opinion greatly.62 The trial court barred 
admission of his opinions as to the truck’s speed, the “tracking 
 
 54. Lewis v. State, 469 P.2d 689, 695 (Alaska 1970). 
 55. Oxenberg, 362 P.2d at 900 (“[T]he witness was qualified to express an 
opinion on the matter in issue.”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. (“The record not only bears out those determinations, but also shows 
that the witness had a sufficient acquaintance through personal observation and 
other means of investigation to enable him to express an opinion.”). 
 58. Id. (noting “personal observation” as part of inspector’s methodology). 
 59. Id. (“[T]he origin of the fire could not have been properly understood or 
determined without the aid of an opinion from a person of special knowledge 
and experience.”). 
 60. Id. 
 61. 484 P.2d 250 (Alaska 1971). 
 62. Id. at 269. 
2 - HENRIKSON__FINAL2.DOC 12/11/2008  2:50:15 PM 
224 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 25:2 
tendencies of the trailer” and the trailer’s location relative to the center 
of the road at impact.63 The basis for these rulings was said to be Voigt’s 
lack of qualification and his impermissible attempts to testify to the 
ultimate issue.64 Whether that was the whole story or not, the Alaska 
Supreme Court ostensibly reviewed these exclusions simply as a test of 
Voigt’s qualifications to testify.65 On that basis, they upheld the trial 
court’s exclusion.66 
A more detailed look at the Ferrell court’s reasoning reveals that, as 
in Oxenberg, the court’s analysis of Voigt’s opinion involved a good deal 
more than merely a checking of baseline qualifications. For example, in 
determining whether Voigt could be allowed to arrive at a conclusion 
regarding the speed of the collision based on a post-accident 
photograph, the Alaska Supreme Court reasoned: 
We can find no showing in the record to indicate that Mr. Voigt 
had “reasonable contact with the subject matter” under 
discussion. Mere observation of numerous accident scenes after 
the fact would not necessarily make him an expert in this field. 
Nor would extensive driving experience give him the 
knowledge to tell from a photograph the speed of the vehicles 
involved.67 
The court is clearly going beyond a mere qualification inquiry in 
this case, especially in light of the fact that Voigt had experience with 
accident investigation and had been qualified to testify in previous 
cases. If he was unqualified, why was he allowed to offer any testimony? 
Furthermore, the “subject matter” at issue in a genuine dispute over 
qualification would be a great deal broader than a particular accident 
scene. One would expect an attack on his lack of training or experience. 
The challenge here was more specific: whether Voigt could be permitted 
to look at some photos, make his own experience-based assessment, and 
announce a speed. The trial court forbade this, and the Alaska Supreme 
Court upheld that decision. Yet in substance, this exclusion bears a 
striking similarity to the sort of free-ranging, discretionary analysis 
allowed under the flexible factors approach of Kumho Tire.68 
 
 63. Id. at 268–69. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 268. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See, e.g., Weaver v. Blake, 454 F.3d 1087, 1090–92 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(affirming district court opinion regarding officer’s expert opinion on point of 
vehicle collision and which vehicle crossed the yellow line); Cobb v. Dawson, 
No. 5:06-cv-066 (HL), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91177, at *14 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 12, 2007) 
(considering challenge to expert’s opinion on impact and braking speeds under 
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Likewise, the Ferrell court’s discussion of the trailer’s precise 
position sounds a lot more like a reliability analysis under Daubert and 
Kumho Tire than an initial review of “qualifications.” As the court stated: 
Similarly, we find no merit in appellants’ third contention of 
error that Mr. Voigt should have been permitted to answer a 
question expressing an opinion as to the location of the rear of 
the trailer relative to the center of the road at the time of 
impact. Although the basis for the question was to be Voigt’s 
observation of the truck, tracks and point of impact at the 
scene, it called for more than his observations. It also asked 
Voigt’s opinion. To give his opinion, Voigt had to qualify as an 
expert able to determine the position of the vehicles at the time 
of the collision based on a view of the scene after the accident. 
We are not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion 
in finding that Mr. Voigt did not possess sufficient knowledge 
to assist the jury in determining this issue.69 
Though couched in terms of Voigt’s “qualification,” the particular 
opinion at issue was a classic Daubert issue—an expert’s opinion arising 
from an inspection of the scene combined with prior experience. Because 
this was well before both Daubert and Alaska’s adoption of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence,70 it is not surprising that the analysis was couched in 
terms of “qualification.” But the analysis essentially determined whether 
a particular expert had any reliable basis for coming to his particular 
conclusions. In this case, the expert did not have a reliable basis for his 
conclusions and was rightly rejected. 
Another example of the early Alaska approach can be found in 
Fairbanks v. Nesbett.71 In Nesbett, the court upheld exclusion of a 
 
flexible factors approach and deeming it “unorthodox” but admissible under the 
circumstances); Olson v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1143 (D.N.D. 
2006) (allowing accident reconstruction expert to testify on basic elements of 
crash, but barring testimony regarding “‘phantom acceleration’ from a defective 
speed control system, or any opinion testimony as to specific design defects of 
the 1998 Ford Explorer”); Melberg v. Plains Mktg., L.P., 332 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 
1257 (D.N.D. 2004) (considering challenge to expert’s calculation of impact speed 
based on Daubert and Kumho Tire); Tunnell v. Ford Motor Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d 
731, 748 (W.D. Va. 2004) (allowing expert opinion on speed of vehicle at impact, 
“provided that the data from the restraints control module on the test and 
accident vehicles is substantially similar”). 
 69. Ferrell, 484 P.2d at 268. 
 70. The Federal Rules of Evidence were largely adopted by the Alaska 
Supreme Court acting in its administrative capacity, pursuant to Supreme Court 
Order 364 effective August 1, 1979. 
 71. 432 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1967). 
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proffered expert on a motorcycle’s stopping ability relative to a car.72 
The expert’s testimony was elicited to show that the defendant, as an 
inexperienced motorcycle driver, should have been going slower to 
begin with because he would not have been able to stop quickly enough 
at his speed.73 The court noted that the witness “presented no uniform 
charts and admitted he had never conducted experiments on stopping 
characteristics.”74 The trial court also found that testimony about a 
motorcycle’s comparative stopping ability had little relevance to the 
facts at issue: there was no testimony that appellee saw or could have 
seen the vehicle before the accident, and “appellee’s unrebutted 
testimony was that ‘there was just barely enough time to even reach for 
the brakes.’“75 In modern parlance, there was no “fit” between the 
methodology and the issues in contention.76 
Thus, the irony of the current state of confusion is that none of it is 
necessary. The Alaska Supreme Court crafted a sensible procedure for 
reviewing the methodology of proffered expert testimony long before 
the national controversy arrived in Alaska’s courts. Under these 
precedents, which have never been overruled, trial courts should indeed 
be permitted to act as gatekeepers that guard juries against experts with 
nothing of substance to offer. The precise terminology or factors used to 
describe this process is not important. Neither is the particular modern 
evidence rule cited in authority. What is important is that trial courts be 
reassured that they have the authority to take a hard look at proffered 
opinions and to block them, or even to exclude all experts if they will do 
more harm than good to the fact-finding process. 
C. Qualification of the Expert to Testify Versus Qualification of the 
Expert as an Expert 
Although the precise terminology used is not the critical part, it can 
give rise to confusion, particularly regarding an expert’s “qualification.” 
This is an ambiguous concept. In most recent cases, an expert’s 
“qualification” is nothing more than the evidentiary foundation 
 
 72. Id. at 612. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1299 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]here is no 
fit where a large analytical leap must be made between the facts and the 
opinion.”) (citing General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (offering 
animal studies showing one type of cancer in mice to establish causation of 
another type of cancer in humans is “simply too great an analytical gap between 
the data and the opinion offered”)). 
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(sometimes established at a brief bench hearing) of his underlying 
personal expertise.77 However, the Alaska courts’ use of an expanded 
“qualification” in these older cases makes some sense, even if it is 
confusing. After all, nobody is “qualified” to offer an ipse dixit opinion 
unless the witness in question is coming down from a fiery mountain 
with a brace of stone tablets.78 In this sense, however, the “qualification” 
analysis is looking at the expert’s methodology, not just his curriculum 
vitae. As the case law has developed, consideration of “qualification” 
has been relegated to a purely foundational, threshold analysis with 
little, if any, attention paid to the opinion or underlying methodology. 
Rather, the court’s focus is on the training and background of the expert 
himself.79 
Under Alaska law, the baseline test for personal qualification as an 
expert witness is whether the witness “has the requisite intelligence and 
reasonable contact with the subject matter to allow him to demonstrate 
his expertise with reasonable skill.”80 There is no requirement that the 
witness devote full time to the specialty.81 There is also no requirement 
that the witness have any advanced education, or indeed any formal 
education at all.82 Such decisions regarding an expert’s personal 
qualification are left to the sound discretion of the trial courts.83 
Yet the question of an expert’s basic, personal qualification as an 
expert is separate and distinct from the question of whether the 
proffered opinion is helpful or based on some reliable methodology. It is 
therefore possible for a fully qualified expert to offer an opinion devoid 
of any utility for the trier of fact. One of the classic types of opinions 
rejected by courts under the Federal Rules of Evidence is the so-called 
 
 77. See id. at 1296–98. 
 78. Navarro v. Fuji Heavy Indus., 117 F.3d 1027, 1031 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[A] 
conclusion without any support is not one based on expert knowledge and 
entitled to the dignity of evidence.”) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 
U.S. 579, 590 (1993)). 
 79. See, e.g., Doisher v. State, 632 P.2d 242, 256–57 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981) 
(upholding trial court’s decision to allow fingerprint analyst with training in tool 
marks to testify as to tool marks). 
 80. Lewis v. State, 469 P.2d 689, 693–94 (Alaska 1970). 
 81. State v. Phillips, 470 P.2d 266, 270 (Alaska 1970) (citing Lewis, 469 P.2d at 
693). 
 82. See, e.g., Barrett v. Era Aviation, Inc., 996 P.2d 101, 103 (Alaska 2000) 
(reversing trial court’s exclusion of pilot testifying as to mechanical question 
where apparent basis was lack of formal licensing). 
 83. See Pedersen v. State, 420 P.2d 327, 335 (Alaska 1966) (“[T]he decision in 
regard to the requisite qualifications of an expert witness is left to the trial 
court’s discretion and is reviewable only for abuse.”); see also City of Fairbanks v. 
Nesbett, 432 P.2d 607, 611–12 (Alaska 1967); Crawford v. Rogers, 406 P.2d 189, 
192–93 (Alaska 1965). 
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ipse dixit opinion.84 Such an opinion is propped up solely by the expert’s 
impressive qualifications. The expert announces, in effect, that the 
opinion is so because he says it is so. 
In spite of the fact that the federal standard and the state standard 
do not really stand at odds, the clash of terminology has made the 
standard’s application today extraordinarily confusing. For example, in 
Barrett v. Era Aviation, Inc.,85 a passenger sued the airline for alleged 
barotrauma arising from pressure variations he claimed to have 
experienced on a shuttle to the North Slope.86 The plaintiff sought to 
introduce testimony from an airplane pilot, John Spencer, regarding 
alleged negligence in maintaining the Convair’s pressurization system.87 
The trial court precluded his testimony in part, preventing him from 
testifying about the standard of care for aircraft maintenance or opining 
on Era’s negligence.88 Although the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the 
trial court because of a split decision, it reasoned that Spencer had 
satisfied the minimal “qualifications” for testifying as an expert even if 
he was not licensed as a mechanic, since “as a pilot, Spencer is required 
to possess significant knowledge about the proper maintenance of the 
planes he flies.”89 The supreme court held that a trial court is expected to 
balance “the value of the evidence against the danger of undue 
prejudice, distraction of the jury from the issues, and waste of time” 
when ruling on whether to exclude an expert based on qualifications.90 
The Barrett court cited Lewis v. State91 for this odd proposition, but 
Lewis simply held that the trier of fact should be permitted to hear 
qualified expert testimony where the jury “would have benefited” from 
the proffered testimony.92 In fact, the text quoted from Lewis comes from 
a different portion of the Lewis opinion that addresses the question of 
whether the court felt the proffered expert testimony was unfairly 
prejudicial.93 This is often referred to as a Rule 403 analysis.94 It has no 
 
 84. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
 85. 996 P.2d 101 (Alaska 2000). 
 86. Id. at 102. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 103–04. 
 90. Id. (quoting Lewis v. State, 469 P.2d 689, 695–96 (Alaska 1970)). 
 91. 469 P.2d 689 (Alaska 1970). 
 92. Id. at 694–95. 
 93. Id. at 696 (“The trial judge may have felt that the testimony . . . would 
have been unduly prejudicial against the state. We have previously stated that in 
determining whether to admit or exclude demonstrative evidence, the trial judge 
must balance the value of evidence against the danger of undue prejudice, 
distraction of the jury from the issues, and waste of time.” (citing Love v. State, 
457 P.2d 622 (Alaska 1969))). 
 94. ALASKA R. EVID. 403. 
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direct bearing on the question of expert admission, except to the extent 
that the expert’s opinion or his demonstrative aids create some special 
threat of unfair prejudice. Moreover, the trial court’s ruling in the Barrett 
case is fully in keeping with earlier Alaska cases, where trial courts were 
permitted to keep experts from straying too far beyond the bounds of 
their knowledge or their ability in a particular case.95 
The Barrett court’s confusion on this point arises from the 
confounding nature of the “qualification” analysis. The trial court 
examined more than Spencer’s resume, looking to the opinions he was 
proffering and what methods he used to support it. Given the precedent 
already examined, the trial court should have been able to do this, even 
though this inquiry technically goes beyond “qualification” into a 
review of methodology and fitness. The cure for this problem is simple. 
Courts should clarify the distinction between threshold questions of 
expert qualification and more detailed questions regarding the reliability 
of expert opinions. 
III. THE FEDERAL STANDARD IN ALASKA: ACCEPTING DAUBERT 
BUT REJECTING KUMHO TIRE 
The relationship between Alaska and the federal standard has been 
a complicated one. First, the Alaska Supreme Court accepted Daubert 
and applied its more rigorous gatekeeping standard to scientific 
experts.96 However, the court later rejected Kumho Tire and, in the 
process, adopted a standard that leaves the trial courts with little 
gatekeeping authority regarding non-scientific experts.97 This approach 
has the distinct disadvantage of both placing Alaska courts in the 
precarious terrain in which the federal courts found themselves before 
Kumho Tire and also making it easier for unqualified hired guns to 
qualify as experts. What is most distressing about this situation is that, 
as argued above, Alaska had already laid the groundwork for an 
effective and distinctly Alaskan approach to expert testimony even 
before the drafting of the Federal Rules. 
 
 
 95. See Barrett, 996 P.2d at 102; accord Pedersen v. State, 420 P.2d 327, 335 
(Alaska 1966); City of Fairbanks v. Nesbett, 432 P.2d 607, 611–12 (Alaska 1967). 
 96. See State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 395 (Alaska 1999); see also infra Part III.A. 
 97. See Marron v. Stromstad, 123 P.3d 992, 1005–06 (Alaska 2005); see also 
infra Part III.B. 
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A. Frye and Daubert Battle in Alaska 
From the broad questions of expert admissibility, we move to the 
much narrower question of the in-court use of novel scientific methods 
or theories. Testimony arising from hypnotherapy has long been a 
controversial subject in United States courts. The issue came to a head in 
Alaska with the State v. Contreras98 decision, where the purported 
victims of crime had their memories refreshed via hypnosis prior to 
identifying the defendant.99 The defendants argued that there would be 
no way for the witness or any expert to be sure what part of the post-
hypnosis testimony was real and what part was the product of 
suggestion or confabulation and that the witness would be prone to false 
confidence in the revived memories.100 The lower courts came to 
opposite conclusions on the question.101 The Alaska Supreme Court took 
review of the decision and held as a matter of law that a witness who 
has been previously hypnotized may “testify only to facts which he 
related prior to hypnosis.”102 The court considered “a variety of 
empirical and theoretical works” regarding the definition and reliability 
of hypnosis and concluded that “it is apparent that suggestibility poses a 
fundamental problem with admitting hypnotically induced statements 
or recollections.”103 
Over a decade later, the Alaska Supreme Court revisited the 
question in State v. Coon.104 In Coon, the defendant was charged with 
terroristic threatening for leaving voicemail messages.105 The State 
proffered the testimony of a voice analysis expert “who compared the 
voice on the answering machine with verbatim voice exemplars 
provided by Coon.”106 The trial court allowed the testimony.107 The court 
of appeals reversed, holding that the State had failed to establish, 
 
 98. 674 P.2d 792 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). 
 99. Id. at 794–95. The Contreras appeal actually involved two cases where the 
trial courts had come to conflicting decisions. Id. 
 100. Id. at 795–96. 
 101. Id. at 794–95. Judge Serdahely ruled that the witness “could not testify at 
trial regarding any matter discussed by her with the hypnotist during the 
hypnotic session.” Id. at 794. Judge Buckalew ruled that any undue influence of 
the hypnosis was “a matter affecting [the witness’s] credibility to be determined 
by the jury and not a matter of competency to be determined by the court.” Id. at 
794–95. 
 102. Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 130 (Alaska 1986). 
 103. Id. at 131 (footnote omitted). 
 104. 974 P.2d 386, 388 (Alaska 1999). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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pursuant to Frye, that the scientific community “generally accepted 
voice spectrographic analysis.”108 
The supreme court reversed, rejected Frye, and seemingly adopted 
the federal standard for admission of expert testimony.109 The Coon court 
first examined the Alaska Rules of Evidence, noting that under Rule 
104(a) of the Alaska Rules of Evidence the trial court has a “duty to 
determine preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a 
person to be a witness and the admissibility of evidence.”110 The court 
noted that relevant evidence was generally admissible unless barred by 
Rule 403 of the Alaska Rules of Evidence, and that under Rule 702, 
experts were allowed to offer “helpful opinion testimony” that, under 
Rule 703, can be based on “facts or data of a type reasonably relied upon 
by experts in the field.”111 The court held that: 
[E]xpert opinion evidence is admissible if the trial court 
(exercising its authority under Rule 104(a)) determines that (1) 
the evidence is relevant (Rule 401); (2) the witness is qualified 
as an expert (Rule 702(a)); (3) the trier of fact will be assisted 
(Rule 702(a)); (4) the facts or data on which the opinion is based 
are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular 
field in forming opinions upon the subject (Rule 703); and (5) 
the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect (Rule 403).112 
Furthermore: 
Our evidence rules give trial courts both the authority and the 
responsibility to determine the admissibility of such evidence 
without being limited to the general acceptance standard. They 
preclude this inquiry from focusing exclusively on general 
acceptance or any other single factor. Our evidence rules 
contemplate a broader inquiry, allowing a proponent to 
establish admissibility even if general acceptance is absent, and 
allowing an opponent to challenge admissibility even if general 
acceptance is present.113 
Thus, for scientific experts offering a novel theory, the court held 
that trial courts would be permitted to subject an expert’s theory to a 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 395 (holding Daubert the standard for admission of expert 
testimony). 
 110. Id. at 392–93. 
 111. Id. at 393 (footnotes omitted) (citing ALASKA R. EVID. 702). 
 112. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 113. Id. 
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Daubert inquiry rather than being limited to testing for general 
acceptance.114 At the same time, the court said nothing definite in Coon 
about how or even if trial courts would be permitted to scrutinize a non-
scientific expert’s testimony. That question was answered for the federal 
courts in Kumho Tire shortly after Coon was handed down.115 For several 
years there was an open question as to whether Alaska courts would 
adopt this broadened application of Daubert.116 At the same time, there 
was a growing confusion over exactly what discretion trial courts had in 
scrutinizing proffered testimony.117 
B. Marron v. Stromstad Rejects Kumho Tire and Repudiates 
Gatekeeping 
 After adopting Daubert in Coon, the Alaska Supreme Court 
strangely rejected Kumho Tire’s expansion of the federal standard in 
Marron v. Stromstad.118 In that case, the court considered whether a 
treating physician proffering expert testimony as to the potential for 
future treatment should be subject to a Coon reliability analysis.119 As to 
the physician, the court decided that “when a treating physician testifies 
regarding a course of treatment, the physician’s testimony need not be 
subjected to a Daubert analysis.”120 The Marron court considered and 
expressly rejected the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Kumho 
Tire.121 The court limited Coon “to expert testimony based on scientific 
theory, as opposed to testimony based upon the expert’s personal 
experience.”122 
The supreme court further rejected an effort to apply the Coon 
analysis to reconstruction expert Jim Stirling.123 The court noted that 
Stirling satisfied the “liberal admissibility standard” for expert 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 146–49 (1999). 
 116. See Ratliff v. State, 110 P.3d 982, 985 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005) (noting that 
the Alaska Supreme Court had not yet adopted Kumho Tire); Vent v. State, 67 
P.3d 661, 669–70 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (applying Kumho Tire); Bourdon v. State, 
Nos. A-7689, A-7699, 2002 WL 31761482, at *7 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2002) 
(“Neither this court nor the Alaska Supreme Court has ruled on the 
admissibility of a child abuse expert’s testimony after Daubert and Coon.”). 
 117. See supra Part II.C. 
 118. 123 P.3d 992 (Alaska 2005). 
 119. Id. at 1001. 
 120. Id. at 1002. 
 121. Id. at 1004. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 1003. 
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witnesses.124 That standard, as now expressed, “allows any person with 
specialized knowledge to serve as an expert witness, so long as that 
knowledge is relevant, in that it can help the trier of fact understand 
evidence or determine facts in issue.”125 What is notably missing is 
approval of any gatekeeping role beyond the bare rubber stamping of 
threshold relevancy and some level of qualification. Likewise, the court 
rejected any reliability analysis for the expert Dr. Rubenstein. The court 
acknowledged that “the superior court admitted the testimony of 
Stirling and Dr. Rubenstein based on the reliability of their expertise in 
general, rather than its application in this particular case.”126 The court 
endorsed this analysis,127 implying strongly that trial courts should no 
longer examine the application of expertise to any particular case. The 
new holding threatened to overturn earlier Alaska Supreme Court 
opinions that rejected experts for gaps between experience and opinion 
or for lack of reliable methodology. Fortunately, the Marron court did 
not overtly address this discrepancy, and some hope remains that trial 
courts will be given back the latitude they once enjoyed to make basic 
reliability and fitness determinations of all proffered experts. 
C. The Mess Marron Has Made 
The Marron court’s rejection of Kumho Tire and admonishment 
against excluding any non-scientific experts has left Alaska trial courts 
in a difficult position. The new rule appears not only to limit the formal 
Daubert factors to hard science, but also to limit the trial court’s role to a 
merely rubber stamping a baseline level of qualification. This approach 
has led to serious practical problems and rests on questionable logic. 
First, the practical impact of Marron has been strong. For example, 
in Marsingill v. O’Malley,128 the court rejected an attempt to apply the 
reliability analysis of Coon to expert physicians testifying as to the 
appropriate level of care.129 The court reasoned that: 
Dr. O’Malley’s experts possessed the relevant personal 
experience. Each had extensive experience with patients and 
was routinely called upon to respond to patients’ questions 
 
 124. Id. at 1002 (quoting John’s Heating Serv. v. Lamb, 46 P.3d 1024, 1034 
(Alaska 2002)). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 1004. 
 127. Id. at 1004–08. The supreme court did not explain how to analyze the 
reliability of expertise in general, other than by verifying the existence of a CV 
and minimal credentials. 
 128. 128 P.3d 151 (Alaska 2006). 
 129. Id. at 160. 
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during late night telephone calls. In addition, Dr. Braddock had 
completed several studies on the amount of information that 
doctors give patients in a variety of circumstances. As the trial 
court correctly observed, “an understanding of what a patient 
needs to know . . . and understanding what a doctor needs to 
say, is . . . related to what doctors do.” We have consistently 
recognized that experience-based expert testimony is 
admissible when the expert witness has substantial experience 
in the relevant field and the testimony might help the jury.130 
This sweeps very broadly indeed. The Marsingill court appears to 
be holding that the opinions of non-scientific experts should not 
undergo any reliability scrutiny. The trial court is essentially given a 
two-part checklist: if the witness has experience or other qualification, 
and if his proffered testimony has any theoretical applicability to a 
matter in contention, then it must be admitted. No further analysis is 
permitted unless the proffered testimony involves a novel scientific 
theory. 
Though this approach furthers the Alaska Supreme Court’s policy 
of liberally admitting expert testimony, it also opens the door to abuse. 
Parties can ensure that their experts avoid any serious scrutiny by 
classifying the experts’ testimonies as experience-based rather than 
scientific. Experts are free to announce whatever conclusions they need 
to provide in order to support the side they wish to see victorious. 
Though cross-examination can provide some safeguards against this 
sort of abuse, the inquiry at that stage is obviously restricted by the rules 
of admissibility and any other limitations on permissible lines of 
questioning. A court in a pretrial hearing can make free inquiry into the 
expert’s methodology without fear of prejudicing the jury or opening 
the door to otherwise impermissible evidence. Furthermore, reliance on 
a jury with little background on the case to determine who is a real 
expert and who is a charlatan abdicates the court’s role as gatekeeper. 
The current regime in Alaska is similar to the world-turned-upside-
down the federal courts grappled with in the period between Daubert 
and Kumho Tire. Those experts who offer experience-based testimony are 
essentially given a free pass, while those who go to the trouble of 
applying some level of scientific rigor are held to a much higher 
standard. Moreover, even if Coon’s adoption of Daubert were complete, 
and not merely a limited adoption solely to liberalize the standard, this 
would not end the problem. A whole line of federal decisions evolved 
 
 130. Id. (citation omitted). 
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during that misty period devoted to resolving the alchemical distinction 
between “scientific testimony” and other types of testimony.131 
In addition to the practical problems in its wake, the Marron court’s 
reasoning may well be called into question. The court cited criticism of 
Kumho Tire, but on closer examination some of this seems to be 
misplaced. For example, the Logerquist v. McVey132 decision was cited 
with approval in Marron.133 Contrary to the Marron court’s insinuation, 
however, the Arizona court in Logerquist both retained Frye and rejected 
Daubert.134 Moreover, the Logerquist opinion has been met with 
considerable criticism and confusion.135 The court also relied on the 
Montana opinion, Gilkey v. Schweitzer.136 Montana’s approach has 
created considerable confusion about what standard the Montana courts 
are applying.137 
Furthermore, there is a real question as to whether a rejection of 
Kumho Tire was even needed in order to uphold the trial court. As Chief 
Justice Bryner noted in his concurring opinion: “In my view, the 
superior court’s evidentiary rulings can easily be sustained as correct 
 
 131. See, e.g., Richard T. Stilwell, Monitoring the Opinions of Biochemists and 
Beekeepers: The Application of Daubert & Robinson to Engineering Witnesses in 
Texas, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 95, 101 (1999); Gerald J. Todaro, The Admissibility of 
Medical Testimony in Ohio: Daubert, Joiner and Ohio’s Relevance-Reliability 
Standard, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 319 (1998); G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert 
Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and Its Progeny, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
939, 951–55 (1995–96). 
 132. 1 P.3d 113 (Ariz. 2000). 
 133. Marron v. Stromstad, 123 P.3d 992, 1006 (Alaska 2005) (“Expanding 
Daubert’s scope to include all expert testimony seriously exacerbates these 
problems. Several states have agreed, and have declined to adopt the expansion 
of Daubert that Kumho Tire accomplished.”) (footnote omitted). 
 134. Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 125–30. 
 135. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Logerquist v. McVey: The Majority’s 
Flawed Procedural Assumptions, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 121, 136 (2001) (“[I]t would be a 
grave mistake to construe Rule 104(a) as requiring the trial judge to 
unquestioningly accept facially sufficient foundational testimony.”); David L. 
Faigman, Embracing the Darkness: Logerquist v. McVey and the Doctrine of 
Ignorance of Science Is an Excuse, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 89 (2001) (“Logerquist appears 
to be mainly an aberration. It is a dead-end detour along the path to scientific 
competence among judges and lawyers.”); Crane McClennen, Frye, Daubert, and 
Logerquist: Is Arizona Moving Ahead or Going in Circles?, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 571, 584 
(2002). 
 136. 983 P.2d 869 (Mont. 1999). 
 137. See, e.g., State v. Clifford, 121 P.3d 489, 500–01 (Mont. 2005) (Nelson, J., 
concurring) (“[W]e have, since, essentially done away with the Daubert 
standards by limiting the requirements of that case and the courts’ gatekeeping 
obligation to proffered expert testimony of “novel” scientific evidence only. In 
doing so, we have committed an error of logic.”) (citations omitted); Robert L. 
Sterup, Into the Twilight Zone: Admissibility of Scientific Expert Testimony in 
Montana after Daubert, 58 MONT. L. REV. 465, 485–86 (1997). 
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applications of Daubert and Kumho. The opinion’s categorical refusal to 
extend these cases to experience-based expert testimony is unnecessary, 
overbroad, and unsound.”138 As Justice Bryner correctly noted, there 
was no indication that the trial court’s reasoning would be rejected by a 
federal court under Kumho Tire.139 One of the main thrusts of that 
opinion was that the Daubert factors may or may not be applicable and 
that the trial courts should exercise their own discretion on what factors 
to apply. 
Of course, there is an argument that allowing more expert 
testimony into court is a good thing because it allows both sides to 
present their best cases to the jury with minimal interference from the 
court. Alaska has a long tradition of respecting the wisdom of juries, 
particularly when any factual issues are in question. Perhaps more than 
federal courts, Alaska’s civil system keeps the jury at the center of civil 
litigation. The Alaska Supreme Court is apparently concerned that if the 
full federal standard were adopted, Alaska trial courts will become 
austere and rigid, keeping each side from having its say and interfering 
too much in the weighing of evidence.140 Even assuming Alaska’s trial 
courts would go down that road, a better solution would be fleshing out 
the limits of the gatekeeping process—not abolishing the gatekeeping 
process altogether. 
IV. BACK TO THE FUTURE 
Casting Alaska trial courts into these murky realms is not in 
keeping with the long tradition of common sense and broad discretion 
in this state. The courts are busy enough without having to study the 
convoluted mass of federal case law in an attempt to distinguish who is 
a “scientific” expert. There is a strong tendency to simply let anyone 
with a degree or sufficient experience into court with the hope that the 
adversarial process will sort out any problems. The introduction of 
experts is no longer a court-controlled process, but a party-controlled 
process. Yet, at the same time, these witnesses are still granted 
enormous testimonial privileges that no mere fact witness can claim. 
They can fill in critical evidentiary gaps on causation for a plaintiff. They 
are also given ostensible approval as “experts.” By allowing the parties 
to take total control of the process and leaving any criticism of the 
methodology or reliability to be hashed out on cross examination, the 
 
 138. Marron, 123 P.3d at 1014 (Bryner, C.J., concurring). 
 139. Id. (Bryner, C.J., concurring). 
 140. See id. at 1005–06. 
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current system has essentially abandoned the proverbial gate which 
Alaska courts long guarded. 
The Alaska Supreme Court should revisit the broad rejection of 
Kumho Tire in Marron and ask whether either opinion was really 
necessary. The groundwork for a distinctly Alaskan approach was 
actually put in place decades before any of these opinions, and the best 
guidance for trial courts may well be a return to that common-sense, 
discretionary standard. This is actually in keeping with the discretionary 
standard the Supreme Court endorsed in Kumho Tire. 
The Alaska courts should remember the importance of the central 
question—is this expert offering anything to the jury? For it is the jury 
the expert must help, not merely the interest of one party or the other. If 
the proffered testimony is nothing more than an unsupported opinion or 
agreement-for-hire garnished with the imprimatur of “expert,” then it 
will not be helpful to the trier of fact. Indeed, it stands a good chance of 
confusing them and unfairly prejudicing the case. 
Turning to some of the seminal cases that came down after 
statehood, we find surprising insight that may help guide future 
determinations. While the language used in these earlier opinions did 
not include any of the modern Daubert and Kumho Tire jargon, a careful 
reading shows that trial courts of the time were in fact performing as 
gatekeepers. They were entertaining not just foundational questions of 
qualification but were conducting very detailed oversight. The courts 
were not afraid to preclude testimony if an expert’s reach exceeded his 
grasp. There was no federal authority in play then, of course, since 
Alaska had not adopted the Federal Rules. But the courts in Alaska came 
to pretty much the same conclusion by 1961 that the United States 
Supreme Court came to in 1999. The Alaska Supreme Court saw it as 
entirely appropriate for trial courts to scrutinize both the expert’s 
expertise and his proffered testimony. It was only in more recent times, 
with the confusing acceptance/rejection of the federal standard, that the 
role of trial courts has become confused. Oxenberg, Ferrell, and other 
decisions should be looked to as authority today. They are, after all, still 
good case law, and the basic premise underlying their approach is 
sound. 
Under this approach, trial courts would be permitted broad 
discretion when considering the qualifications of the expert and whether 
his proffered testimony ought to be admitted. This discretion would 
expressly not require any particular formal hearings or rules but could 
be applied as and when needed, provided the court had an opportunity 
to hear from both sides. Requiring the court to hold a formal hearing, as 
some cases have suggested, would undercut the discretion and make 
simple issues far more complicated. For example, if a challenged expert 
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can, after reasonable opportunity, offer no methodology of any kind for 
his conclusion, the trial court ought to have discretion to exclude that 
expert without undergoing an extensive pretrial voir dire. Trial courts 
used to have that authority in Alaska, but it appears to have been pulled 
away for no good reason. 
Trial courts would also be free to engage in a flexible, common-
sense reliability review of methodology for all experts. It is clear that the 
Alaska Supreme Court has been very reluctant to follow the more 
aggressive federal opinions regarding expert testimony and is very 
reluctant to allow a judge to substitute his opinion for that of the jury. 
However, the choice between an activist federal approach and limiting 
review to bare qualifications is a false choice. The middle ground has 
already been discovered by our forebears and needs only be revived and 
fleshed out. A trial court should be free to take a basic look at how the 
experts came to their conclusions. This need not and should not involve 
a second-guessing or credibility analysis. But if, for example, an expert 
wants to testify as to the cause of an auto crash, he should be able to 
explain to the court’s satisfaction how he used his expertise to come to 
that conclusion. If he did nothing more than put some new names in a 
pattern report and sign off on it, then he should not be permitted to offer 
that opinion. He should be able to “show his work” to the court. With 
this discretion in place, the need for the formal rules of Frye or Daubert is 
thrown into question. These may or may not be utilized as the trial court 
sees fit, but in most cases they would not be needed and should not be 
required. 
Trial courts should also be free to ask the elemental question—is it 
needed? This question, among the most basic of all questions dealing 
with the admission of expert testimony, has largely been overlooked in 
the debate. As Justice Dimond noted in Oxenberg, however, if the jury 
doesn’t need experts, then experts should not be admitted. That little 
kernel of wisdom would go a long way towards ensuring that basic 
traffic cases and routine criminal matters not get bogged down with 
costly expert arms races or battles. 
At the same time, in keeping with the longstanding tradition of 
liberal admission of relevant testimony in Alaska, the goal is not and 
must not be substitution of the trial court’s opinion for the expert’s. Nor 
should the fact that the expert’s peers disagree with him be grounds for 
exclusion. Rejection of Frye has helped to cement these principles. Yet 
the gate at the threshold should not be left open. Bare-bones 
qualification regarding an area of expertise should not be all that is 
required. 
To this end, the Alaska Supreme Court should return to the 
common-sense approach adopted in the state long before Daubert or 
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Kumho Tire. The name put on this process is not important. Rather, the 
process must allow trial courts to be free to block from the witness stand 
those offering pronouncements without support, even if their 
credentials are fine. The sweeping admonitions of Marron and other 
recent opinions which appear to forbid any gatekeeping beyond a 
rubber-stamping of bare qualification should be retracted or clarified. 
Gatekeeping is an important aspect of the court’s discretion, and it is 
imperative that trial courts be given this authority once again. As far as 
concerns about access to the judicial system and judges taking the place 
of juries by excluding experts, these issues arose outside Alaska and 
have limited application to this state.141 One is reminded of Shane’s 
admonishment, that “a gun is a tool . . . as good or as bad as the man 
using it.”142 The discretionary procedures for vetting experts are also 
tools, no better or worse than the court using them. Like any powerful 
tool they can be subject to abuse in the wrong hands, but this is not a 
concern that should stay the hand of the Alaska court system. 
CONCLUSION 
Experts are not like other witnesses. They can offer conclusions and 
discuss factual details of a case even though they have no firsthand 
knowledge of events and would otherwise be excluded as incompetent. 
Likewise, hybrid fact/expert witnesses, such as treating physicians, 
have enormous power to sway a case one way or the other. The court 
system’s own rules of evidence make this testimony possible, and the 
courts bear the responsibility of making sure this broad leeway is not 
abused. The adversarial process itself offers strong protections against 
charlatans and mere hired guns, but it is too constrained in open court to 
be the exclusive safeguard. The court itself must make an initial 
determination of fit and reliability whenever expert testimony is 
proffered. Moreover, the court should be permitted to question whether 
experts are needed at all, or if the jury can be trusted to come to its own 
conclusions. This process does not interfere with the adversarial process 
or with the jury’s role; instead, it ensures that the court-issued 
imprimatur does not become an open-ended license. The approach 
taken by early decisions in Alaska should serve as the foundation for 
establishing a new, common-sense approach that is not beholden to the 
latest federal trends. 
 
 
 141. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 142. SHANE (Paramount Pictures 1953). 
